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SARS-CoV is believed to originate from civets and was thought to have been eliminated as a 
threat after the 2003 outbreak. Here, we show that human SARS-CoV (huSARS-CoV) originated 
directly from bats, rather than civets, by a cross-species jump in 1991, and formed a 
human-adapted strain in 1998. Since then huSARS-CoV has evolved further into highly virulent 
strains with genotype T and a 29-nt deletion mutation, and weakly virulent strains with genotype 
C but without the 29-nt deletion. The former can cause pneumonia in humans and could be the 
major causative pathogen of the SARS outbreak, whereas the latter might not cause pneumonia in 
humans, but evolved the ability to co-utilize civet ACE2 as an entry receptor, leading to 
interspecies transmission between humans and civets. Three crucial time points - 1991, for the 
cross-species jump from bats to humans; 1998, for the formation of the human-adapted 
SARS-CoV; and 2003, when there was an outbreak of SARS in humans - were found to associate 
with anomalously low annual precipitation and high temperatures in Guangdong. 
Anti-SARS-CoV sero-positivity was detected in 20% of all the samples tested from Guangzhou 
children who were born after 2005, suggesting that weakly virulent huSARS-CoVs might still 
exist in humans. These existing but undetected SARS-CoVs have a large potential to evolve into 
highly virulent strains when favorable climate conditions occur, highlighting a potential risk for 
the reemergence of SARS.
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Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus (SARS-CoV) is the causative pathogen of 
SARS and can be isolated from humans [1,2], palm civets [3,4], and bats [5,6]. Because SARS-CoVs 
from humans (huSARS-CoV) have a closer phylogenetic relationship with the strains isolated from civets 
(pcSARS-CoV) than those isolated from bats (batSARS-CoV), civets are naturally recognized as the 
immediate reservoir of huSARS-CoV [3,4]. A 29-nucleotide (nt) region, which can be found in the 
genomes of pcSARS-CoVs and early isolates of huSARS-CoVs but not in the genomes of the 
intermediate and later isolates of huSARS-CoVs, was used as compelling evidence to support the direct 
origin of huSARS-CoVs from civets [3,7,8]. However, another study demonstrated that the presence of 
the 29-nt region can not be used as evidence to trace the origin of huSARS-CoVs and argued against the 
cross-species transmission of SARS-CoV from civets to humans [9]. 
Two retrospective investigations revealed that in 2001 41.6% of 77 Beijing children and 1.8% of 938 
Hong Kong adults were positive for SARS-CoV-specific antibody [10,11], whereas two other studies 
showed no seroprevalence of SARS-CoV among wild civets and other animals in Beijing and the 
southeastern provinces of China [4,12]. These data suggest that SARS-CoV existed among humans prior 
to the SARS outbreak and raise doubts about the direct origin of huSARS-CoV from civets. What the 
immediate reservoir of huSARS-CoV is, and when and why it originated, remain to be answered. 
Furthermore, since the SARS epidemic was well controlled, some experts believe that SARS-CoV has 
essentially disappeared as a threat. Recently, however, a new strain of coronavirus that causes acute 
serious respiratory illness similar to SARS appeared in the Middle East [13,14]. Although this virus has a 
closer phylogenic relationship with coronaviruses that infect bats in Southeast Asia than with SARS-CoVs 
[15], it raises a question as to whether SARS-CoV has been eradicated completely.   
Here, we demonstrate that huSARS-CoV originated in 1998.6 through a cross-species jump from 
bats to humans and then further evolved into two lineages - one being highly virulent and associated with 
the SARS outbreak, and another being weakly virulent and then spreading from humans to civets. The 
occurrence of cross-species transmission of SARS-CoV and the SARS outbreak appear to be associated 
with anomalous climate changes in Guangdong. Furthermore, we find that SARS-CoVs may still exist 
among humans, sounding a global alarm on the possibility of the reemergence of SARS. 
Results
Human SARS-CoV originated from bats rather than from palm civets  
The spike (S) protein of SARS-CoV is responsible for viral attachment and entry into host cells and plays 
a crucial role in viral cross-species transmission [16,17]. To investigate the origin of SARS-CoV, we 
constructed a time-scaled maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree using SARS-CoV S gene sequences 
from humans, civets and bats for inferring the ancestral host state of viruses (Fig. 1). In the tree, all 
huSARS-CoVs and pcSARS-CoVs are divided into two sub-clades, one (sub-clade I) containing all 2003 
huSARS-CoVs with one exception, and another (sub-clade II) including all pcSARS-CoVs and two 
huSARS-CoVs. Strains within sub-clades I and II have the most recent common ancestors (MRCAs) at 
nodes D and F, respectively, and share an earlier ancestor at node C. The ancestral host states of MRCAs 
were estimated to be exclusively human at nodes C, D and F (Fig. 1, left upper panel), indicating a 
transmission route from humans to civets [7,8]. All batSARS-CoVs form two sub-clades. One is located at 
the most basal position of the tree, and another clusters with the clade comprising huSARS-CoVs and 
pcSARS-CoVs and shares a MRCA at node B (Fig. 1). The ancestral host states of MRCAs most likely 
are bat at both nodes A and B (Fig. 1, left upper panel), suggesting a cross-species transmission from bats 
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to humans. 
Figure 1 Maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree of SARS-CoV based on spike genes. Ancestral 
host states were reconstructed using Bayesian phylogeographic inference framework implemented in the 
BEAST v1.6.2 package. The host state posterior probabilities of the most recent common ancestors 
(MRCAs) are shown on the left upper panel. The tree branches are colored according to their respective 
host species. The solid nodes on the trees represent the MRCAs of corresponding virus strains. 
Estimated times of the MRCA (tMRCA) with 95% highest posterior density (HPD) are shown at 
corresponding nodes. The amino acid mutations between two ancestral S sequences at adjacent nodes 
are shown above the corresponding branches. 
Table 1. Amino acid mutations occurring in SARS-CoV S protein during evolution from node B to 
C.  
Functional domain Amino acid mutations Numbers
Fisher’s exact 
test (P)
Receptor-binding 
domain (RBD)
R322L, D326G, K327E, R333K, N336S, T343K, K344R, 
D347N, T353S, P371A, S372T, I375N, T380S, S381N, 
T386S, L388V, I389V, R390K, S391G, S392D, E393D, 
V397I, E401Q, T417M, I421L, A426R, K427N, Q428I, 
Q430A, G431T, K437N, Y439K, S442Y, H443L, K445H, 
T446G, K449R, L455I, S469P, D470P, E471A, G474C, 
V475Y, R476W, T477P, S479N, T480D, D482G, P485T, 
S486T, V487T, P488G, V489I, E490G, A493P, T494Y,
56 <0.0001
Heptad repeat 
(HR) 2
K1163E 1 0.0415
Other region None 0 Not available
The receptor-binding domain and heptad repeat (HR) 2 region of S protein contain 193 (residues: 318-510) and 44 (residues: 
1142-1185) amino acids, respectively. The Fisher’s exact test (Two-sided) was performed for RBD vs. other region and 
HR2 vs. other region. For other details, please see Figure 1.
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) is responsible for viral replication and determines viral 
survival [1,2]. A MCC tree based on the RdRp gene of SARS-CoV was also constructed (Fig. 2). Results 
similar to that of the S gene were observed. At node C leading to huSARS-CoVs and pcSARS-CoVs, the 
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ancestral host state of MRCA was estimated to be human, confirming the transmission of SARS-CoV 
from humans to civets. At node B, the ancestral host state of MRCA was estimated to most likely be bat
(Fig. 2, left upper panel), supporting the transmission route from bats to humans.
Adaptive process of SARS-CoV from bats to humans
Ancestral S protein sequences at nodes B, C, D, F and E were respectively reconstructed. Sequence 
comparison shows that there are 57 amino acid mutations occurring in the S protein from node B to C and 
one mutation occurring from node B to G (Fig. 1 and Table 1). The presence of only one mutation from 
node B to G indicates a long-term stable infection of SARS-CoV in bats, whereas the higher number of 
mutations seen from node B to C implies a complex adaptive process of SARS-CoV in humans after the 
bat-to-human cross-species jump. From node C to its downstream nodes, four amino acid mutations were 
identified. Of them, N479K, D480G, and T487S are involved in the use of civet angiotensin-converting 
enzyme-2 (ACE2) as the entry receptor for SARS-CoV [17], supporting the cross-species transmission 
from humans to civets (Fig. 1). 
Ancestral RdRp protein sequences at the nodes B, C, and the downstream nodes were also 
reconstructed. Compared with that of the S protein, there are only three amino acid mutations occurring in 
SARS-CoV RdRp enzyme from node B to C, and one from node C to its downstream nodes (Figure 2). 
This suggests that the adaptation of SARS-CoV RdRp to the human host is easier than adaptation of the S 
protein.  
Figure 2. Maximum clade credibility tree of SARS-CoV based on RdRp genes. The symbol * 
indicates the strain with a genotype C characteristic of CCGAACGGCC and without the 29-nt 
deletion. The symbol # indicates the strain with a genotype C characteristic of CCGAACGGCC. 
For other details, please see Figure 1.
SARS-CoV evolved into highly and weakly virulent lineages after crossing into humans. 
A previous study showed that SARS-CoVs could be classified into two genotypes, T and C, based on 10 
polymorphism sites - 9404, 9479, 17564, 19838, 21721, 22222, 22517, 23823, 27243, and 27827, and the 
SARS-CoVs of the genotype T appeared to have a higher case fatality rate than those of the genotype C 
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[18] . This suggests that the SARS-CoVs of genotype T may be more virulent than those of genotype C. 
By analyzing the genotypes of SARS-CoVs from two huSARS-CoV-associated sub-clades (I and II), we 
found that except for two strains at the basal position, all strains within sub-clade I belong to genotype T, 
suggesting their potential to be highly virulent, and all strains from sub-clade II belong to genotype C, 
suggesting they may be weakly virulent (Fig. 3). At the basal position of sub-clade I, one genotype C 
strain shares characteristics with those in sub-clade II, and another seems to be intermediate between 
genotypes C and T, implying an evolution from the weakly virulent genotype C strains to the highly 
virulent genotype T strains. This suggests that after jumping from bats into humans, SARS-CoV evolved 
into both highly and weakly virulent lineages.  
Figure 3 The genotype characteristics of huSARS-CoVs and pcSARS-CoVs. The sub-tree of 
the S proteins is obtained from Figure 1. The star indicates that the gap in site 27827 might be due 
to a sequencing error.
Some SARS-CoVs carried the 29-nt deletion, which was previously used as the predominant evidence 
for cross-species transmission of SARS-CoV from civets to humans [7,8]. We found that except for one 
strain at the basal position, all strains within sub-clade I carry the 29-nt deletion, whereas all strains from 
sub-clade II lack the 29-nt deletion (Fig. 3). Interestingly, all genotype T strains have the 29-nt deletion, 
and all genotype C strains appear to lack the 29-nt deletion except one genotype C strain at the basal 
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position of sub-clade I that has the 29-nt deletion (Fig. 3). These indicate a close association between 
genotype T and the 29-nt deletion, suggesting that the 29-nt deletion may also be associated with the 
virulence of SARS-CoV. 
On the other hand, because the MRCAs of both sub-clades I and II have the 29-nt sequence, the earliest 
human-adapted SARS-CoV strain (at node C in Fig. 1) should have the 29-nt sequence, and its ancestor 
batSARS-CoV is presumed to also have the 29-nt sequence. However, sequence comparison of the 29-nt 
region showed that huSARS-CoVs are more similar to the genetically distantly related batSARS-CoVs 
(batSARS-CoV sub-clade II) than their genetically closely related batSARS-CoVs (batSARS-CoV 
sub-clade I) (Fig. S1A and C), implying a recombination in this region. Bootscan analysis confirmed that 
the 29-nt region of huSARS-CoV originated by a recombination between the strains of batSARS-CoV I 
and II (Fig. S1B) [19]. 
Temporal dynamics of SARS-CoV cross-species transmission
The time to the MRCAs (tMRCAs) at several crucial nodes in the MCC trees of both the S and RdRp 
genes was estimated. For the S gene, the tMRCAs at nodes B and C was estimated at 1991.6 (95%HPD, 
1979.8-1999.8) and 1998.6 (95%HPD, 1993.5-2002.0), respectively (Fig. 1). This indicates that the 
SARS-CoV started to jump into humans from bats around 1991.6 and evolved into human-adapted 
huSARS-CoV strains around 1998.6. For the RdRp gene, the tMRCAs at corresponding nodes B and C 
was estimated at 1997.6 (95%HPD, 1991.0-2002.2) and 2001.3 (95%HPD, 1999.4-2002.6), respectively 
(Fig. 2), about 3-6 years later than the estimates based on the S gene. 
Figure 4 Mean annual precipitations and temperatures at Guangdong, China from 
1961-2007. The data on annual precipitations and temperatures of Guangdong were obtained from 
the official reports available at http://www.tqyb.com.cn/NewTqyb/QHGB/GDGB2009.htm and 
http://www.djriver.cn/szygl/szygb.asp.
An association between the cross-species transmission of SARS-CoV and climate conditions
Epidemiological studies [20,21] and phylodynamic analysis demonstrated that Guangdong is the 
geographic origin of huSARS-CoVs (Fig. S2). To investigate whether the cross-species transmission of 
SARS-CoV might be associated with regional climate conditions, we investigated the annual precipitation 
SARS-CoV might still exist in humans 7
7
and temperatures of Guangdong from 1961 to 2007 (Fig. 4). We found that Guangdong experienced the 
second lowest annual precipitation and a relatively high annual temperature in 1991, which happens to 
correspond to the time when SARS-CoV started to jump from bats to humans (Fig. 4). Since 1991, 
Guangdong experienced two other times with very low annual precipitation and higher annual 
temperatures, in 2003 and 2004, well consistent with the time of the outbreak and reemergence of 
SARS-CoV. This type of climate condition also existed in 1998-1999, corresponding to the time of the 
appearance of the earliest human-adapted SARS-CoV (Fig. 4). These observations could suggest an 
association between the cross-species transmission of SARS-CoV and the unusual regional climate 
conditions. 
Table 2. Seroprevalence of SARS-CoV among population in Guangzhou before and after the 
2003-2004 SARS outbreak. 
Infection date
Sampling 
year
Number
Gender Age (years old) Anti-SARS-
CoV 
positive 
number
Percentage 
(%)Male Female Mean Scope 
Infection before 
the SARS
outbreak *
2000-2001 8 NS NS NS NS 6 75
2002 28 NS NS NS NS 17 60.7
Unknown but 
before 2002
6 NS NS NS NS 5 83.3
Total 42 19 15 22.3 3-42 28 66.7
Infection after 
the SARS 
outbreak #
2011 157 102 55 2.7 ≤ 5 34 21.7 
2010 160 104 56 2.5 ≤ 4 23 14.4
2009 157 116 41
2.2 
≤ 3 except 
one with 4
38 24.2 
Total 474 322 152 2.5 ≤ 5 95 20.0
Indeterminatio
n
2011 274 125 149 43.1 ≥ 18 1 0.4
* The gender and age data are unavailable for 8 and 20 samples obtained before the SARS outbreak, respectively.
# All individuals were born after 2005, indicating that they were infected after the SARS outbreak. 
NS: not shown.
Presence of SARS-CoV before and after the 2003-2004 SARS-CoV outbreak  
We obtained serum samples that were collected from 42 individuals during 2001-2002, before the 
SARS outbreak, and detected IgG antibody against SARS-CoV. The result shows that 66.7% of these 
individuals were sero-positive (Table 2). We also determined the seroprevalence of SARS-CoV among 
Guangdong children who all were born after 2005. Among 474 sera samples obtained from these children, 
95 (20%) tested positive for anti-SARS-CoV IgG antibodies (Table 2). In addition, during November and 
December of 2011, we collected blood samples from 19 previous SARS-patients and were able to detect 
IgG antibody against SARS-CoV in only two (10.5%) individuals (data not shown), indicating that the 
specific antibody against SARS-CoV can decrease and/or disappear over time.    
Discussion 
Since the coronaviruses that are phylogenetically most closely related to huSARS-CoVs were 
isolated from palm civets, civets were indisputably considered to be the direct reservoir of huSARS-CoVs 
[3,4]. One reason is that animals often harbor a variety of viruses, so it’s logical to assume that animals are 
the natural reservoir of a new pathogen. Another reason is the discovery of the 29-nt deletion, which is 
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strong evidence for the transmission of SARS-CoV from civets to humans, since it can be detected among 
all pcSARS-CoVs and early isolates of huSARS-CoVs, but not among middle and late isolates of 
huSARS-CoVs [3,7,8]. It was well known that civets played crucial role in expanding SARS-CoV 
transmission during the SARS outbreak [22,23]. However, if huSARS-CoV indeed originated from civets 
through cross-species transmission, we are unable to explain why SARS-CoV-specific antibodies were 
detected among children in Beijing and among adults in Guangdong and Hong Kong before the SARS 
outbreak (Table 2) [10,11], but not among wild civets and animals in Beijing as well as in 12 southeastern 
provinces of China [4,12]. Furthermore, Janies, et al clearly demonstrated that the 29-nt deletion does not 
support the transmission of SARS-CoV from civets to humans, and pointed out that the misleading 
conclusion drawn by previous studies was ascribed to the lack of an outgroup in previous phylogenetic 
analyses [9]. These observations imply that the direct origin of huSARS-CoV still remains elusive. 
The BEAST phylogeographic analysis platform is a robust new tool that can be used to infer the 
geographic or host origin of a virus [24,25]. If the transmission route of SARS-CoV from civets to 
humans is correct, the host state of the MRCA of all huSARS-CoVs and pcSARS-CoVs should be the 
civet. The S and RdRp proteins are the two most crucial proteins for SARS-CoV survival [1,2]. The MCC 
trees of both the S and RdRp genes consistently show that the ancestral host of all huSARS-CoVs and 
pcSARS-CoVs is human, rather than civet. The Bayes factor (BF) test, which determines the statistically 
significant epidemiological linkage (BF>3), supports the transmission of SARS-CoV from humans to 
civets (BF = 23.73 and 120.38 for S and RdRp genes, respectively). These results, together with the 
detection of seroprevalence of SARS-CoVs in Beijing [10], Hong Kong [11] and Guangzhou in 2001 
(Table 2), clearly indicates that the direct origin of huSARS-CoV was not from the civet, rather it was the 
reverse with pcSARS-CoV originating from humans. All batSARS-CoVs are located outside the clade 
comprising all huSARS-CoVs and pcSARS-CoVs, implying that the earliest huSARS-CoV most likely 
evolved from certain batSARS-CoVs. The BF test provides further support for the cross-species 
transmission of SARS-CoV from bats to humans (BF > 3.00 and = 3.38 for S and RdRp genes, 
respectively). In spite of this, we do not exclude the possibility that there might be intervening hosts 
involved in the movement of SARS-CoV from bats to humans. 
To accomplish cross-species transmission, SARS-CoV must overcome at least two crucial 
bottlenecks [26,27]. The first one is that the S protein, which is responsible for viral attachment and entry 
into cells, must evolve the ability to recognize and use the receptor of different host cells [28]. After 
overcoming the receptor barriers, the second obstacle is that the replicase RdRp must adapt the 
intracellular environment of a new host to support productive replication of the viral genome [29]. Thus, 
the adaptation of the S protein to be able to recognize and bind to the new host receptor must be prior to 
the adaptation of the RdRp enzyme [28,29] and, as a result, the estimated time to achieve cross-species 
transmission of SARS-CoV based on the S gene should be sooner than that based on the RdRp gene. The 
date estimated for the cross-species jump of SARS-CoV from bats to humans based on the S gene is 
1991.6, earlier than the estimated 1997.7 based on the RdRp gene. Regarding the tMRCA of 
huSARS-CoVs and pcSARS-CoVs, the estimates based on the S and RdRp genes are 1998.6 and 2001.3, 
respectively, supporting the above presumption that the adaptation of the S protein to human is prior to 
that of the RdRp enzyme. 
Additionally, we note that the adaptation process of the S protein to a human receptor takes seven 
years, about two times longer than that needed for the RdRp enzyme. This indicates that the adaptation of 
the S protein is more difficult than the adaptation of the RdRp enzyme in order for SARS-CoV to 
cross-species jump from bats to humans, and implies that the adaptation of the S protein is the 
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rate-limiting step in this process [28]. The ability of RdRp to effectively support replication of SARS-CoV 
in various cell lines confirmed that the adaptation of the RdRp enzyme is not the crucial step that limits 
the cross-species transmission of SARS-CoV [30]. Therefore, it was hypothesized that the S protein must 
undergo more mutations to overcome the species barrier than the RdRp enzyme does. As expected, 
comparisons of ancestral protein sequences show that the S protein accumulated 57 amino acid mutations 
during the adaptation process of SARS-CoV from bat hosts to human hosts, significantly more than the 
three amino acid mutations that occurred in the RdRp enzyme (P<0.0001, Fisher’s exact test) (Table 1, 
and Fig. 2). 
The receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the S protein is responsible for recognizing and binding to 
ACE2 [31], which is the functional receptor of SARS-CoV [16]. Heptad repeats (HR) 1 and 2 are 
involved in the membrane fusion function of the S protein [32]. Almost all (56, 98.2%) mutations 
occurring in the S protein were found to be located in the RBD, significantly more than those in HR 
region (P<0.0001) and other regions of the S protein (P<0.0001) (Table 1). In particular, these mutations 
in RBD include S479N, T480D, and V487T, all which were demonstrated to determine the receptor 
recognition and binding of SARS-CoV [17,33]. This strongly indicates that the most crucial step in the 
cross-species jump of SARS-CoV from bats to humans is the capacity of the S protein to evolve the 
ability to recognize and bind human ACE2, which has 258 amino acids that differ from bat ACE2 and 
indicates a substantial species barrier [34]. 
When a virus attempts to establish a stable infection in a new host, it often does not require too many 
mutations unless there is strong selective pressure from drugs or there is further cross-species transmission
[28,35]. After the formation of human-adapted strains, SARS-CoV further evolved into two different 
lineages (sub-clades I and II) (Fig. 1). From node C to the sub-clade I strains, only one mutation was 
observed in the S protein, whereas from node C to the sub-clade II strains, a total of four mutations were 
observed. In particular, among these four mutations, N479K, S480G and T487S can all provide the S 
protein with the ability to co-utilize palm civet ACE2 for cellular entry of SARS-CoV [17,28,33]. These 
data strongly suggest that civets received the SARS-CoV infections from humans. After cross-species 
transmission from humans to civets, SARS-CoV could retain the ability to infect humans, which could 
have significantly contributed to the SARS outbreak by expanding the reservoirs for SARS-CoV 
transmission [22,23,36]. 
Genotypes T and C have been demonstrated to be associated with either high or weak virulence of 
SARS-CoV, respectively [18]. Among ten loci determining the SARS-CoV genotype, four (A21721G, 
C22222T, G22517A, G23823T) are located in the S gene, and none in the RdRp gene, implying that the S 
protein contributes to SARS-CoV virulence, but the RdRp enzyme does not. Among two 
huSARS-CoV-associated sub-clades in the S gene MCC, the sub-clade I comprises almost all 
huSARS-CoVs isolated in 2003, whereas the sub-clade II comprises two huSARS-CoVs and all 
pcSARS-CoVs isolated during 2003-2004. Except for two strains located at the basal position, all strains 
within the sub-clade I have genotype T, whereas all sub-clade II strains have genotype C (Fig. 3). In 
addition, all genotype T strains carry the 29-nt deletion, and, with one exception, all genotype C strains 
lack the 29-nt deletion (Fig. 3). This strongly suggests a close association between the genotype T and the 
29-nt deletion, both of which together might determine the virulence of SARS-CoV. This information, 
together with the epidemiological observations that most 2003 huSARS-CoVs can result in pneumonia in 
humans [21,37] and even in civets [38], and whereas pcSARS-CoVs do not cause pneumonia in civets or 
other animals [3], indicates that the strains within sub-clade I are highly virulent and those within 
sub-clade II are weakly virulent [18]. Interestingly, within sub-clade I, the basal strain has a full genotype 
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C polymorphism map and lacks the 29-nt deletion, and the second basal strain has an intermediate 
polymorphism pattern between genotypes C and T, and carries the 29nt-deletion (Fig. 3). Therefore, the 
MRCA of all sub-clade I strains should belong to genotype C and have the 29-nt sequence. This implies 
that the highly virulent huSARS-CoVs leading to the SARS outbreak evolved from the weakly virulent 
strains (Fig. 3). 
The time of formation of the highly virulent huSARS-CoVs was estimated to be 2002.1 (Fig. 3). 
This implies that during 1998.6 to 2002.1, the circulating huSARS-CoVs were weakly virulent strains that 
can cause asymptomatic self-limiting infections that resolve spontaneously. If so, the weakly virulent 
huSARS-CoVs may have been continuously circulating among humans since 1998.6 through to the 
present time. They may not be of concern because they cause non-pneumonic or mild infections. The 
serological data from two retrospective studies supported the presence of the weakly virulent 
huSARS-CoV strains before 2001 since there were no SARS-associated pneumonia cases reported before 
the SARS outbreak [10,11]. Furthermore, another study conducted in Hong Kong showed that even 
during the SARS outbreak the SARS-CoV-associated non-pneumonic infections were more common than 
SARS-CoV pneumonia [39], indicating that weakly virulent huSARS-CoV strains were co-circulating 
with other highly virulent strains during the SARS outbreak. However, because multiple effective control 
and intervention measures implemented in China and other countries helped stop the SARS epidemic 
quickly [40], some experts optimistically believe that SARS-CoV no longer exists in wildlife and has 
essentially disappeared as a threat. 
To confirm the continuing presence of weakly virulent huSARS-CoV strains among humans, we 
performed serological tests on samples from 474 children who were all born in Guangzhou after 2005. 
Ninety five (20%) were found to be sero-positive for SARS-CoV among these children, but only one 
(0.4%) was sero-positive among 274 adults in Guangzhou. In addition, during 2000-2002, we found that 
66.7% of inpatients (including children) in Guangdong were sero-positive for SARS-CoV (Table 2). The 
serological results most likely reflect the actual prevalence of SARS-CoV and are less likely to be due to 
cross reactivity of the ELISA kit with other human coronaviruses (huCoVs). Firstly, the microtiter plates 
(Beijing BGI-GBI Biotech Co., Ltd., Beijing, China) used to detect anti-SARS-CoV antibodies were 
coated with SARS-CoV lysate, which was demonstrated to have high sensitivity and specificity for 
SARS-CoV antibody testing [41]. Secondly, to reduce and/or exclude the possibility of cross reactivity, 
we randomly selected 271 and 90 samples from 474 children and 274 adults, respectively, in order to test 
for IgG antibodies against other huCoVs (Table S1). Among 132 child samples known to be anti-huCoV 
antibody negative, 26 samples tested positive for SARS-CoV-specific antibodies. Of particular importance 
is that among 36 anti-huCoV antibody positive adult samples, none was positive for SARS-CoV-specific 
antibodies. These results demonstrate that the SARS-CoV lysate ELISA IgG Kit that we used is highly 
specific for SARS-CoV antibody. 
The serological results suggest that huSARS-CoV continues to exist after the 2003 SARS outbreak. 
Furthermore, these results, together with the observation that approximately 40% of Beijing children were 
sero-positive in 2001 at a time when only 1.8% of Hong Kong adults were sero-positive, might suggest 
that the weakly virulent huSARS-CoV preferentially infected children [10,11,40]. Because Guangdong is 
the geographic origin of huSARS-CoV (Fig. S2)[21], the very high prevalence (66.7%) of SARS-CoV in 
Guangdong during 2000-2002 might reflect a critical turning point resulting in the SARS outbreak. 
Why did SARS-CoVs jump from bats to humans in 1991, and why did the SARS outbreak occur in 
2003? We found that three crucial time points: 1991, when there was a cross-species transmission of 
SARS-CoV from bats to humans; 1998, when human-adapted SARS-CoV emerged; and 2003, when the 
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SARS outbreak occurred, correspond well with the lower annual precipitation and relatively higher annual 
temperature observed in Guangdong during those years (Fig. 4). In particular, the cross-species 
transmission of SARS-CoV occurred in 1991, a year with the lowest annual precipitation levels (an 
exceptionally dry period) seen in Guangdong in the past three decades. Previous studies showed that low 
absolute humidity favors the airborne survival and transmission of respiratory viruses (e.g. influenza virus) 
[42,43,44]. Because the data on absolute humidity in Guangdong in the past three decades are not 
available, we were unable to determine whether change of absolute humidity in Guangdong was 
associated with the cross-species transmission and outbreak of SARS-CoV. Therefore, whether or not the 
exceptionally dry climate in Guangdong in 1991 facilitated the airborne survival of batSARS-CoVs and 
its cross-species transmission from bats to humans deserves further investigation. 
Figure.5 Evolutionary history of SARS-CoV.
In sum, we show that the earliest ancestor of SARS-CoV appeared in bats in 1978.9 (95%HPD, 
1949.4-1998.8) (Fig. 5). In 1991.6, SARS-CoV began its cross-species jump from bats to humans and 
formed a human-adapted strain in 1998.6. After moving into human hosts, huSARS-CoVs diverged into 
highly virulent strains with genotype T and a 29-nt deletion mutation in 2002.1, and weakly virulent 
strains with genotype C but without the 29-nt deletion in 2000.7 (Fig. 5). The former strains can cause 
pneumonia in humans and could be the major causative pathogen of the 2003 SARS outbreak, whereas 
the latter strains might not cause pneumonia in humans but evolved the ability to co-utilize civet ACE2 as 
SARS-CoV might still exist in humans 12
12
its entry receptor, leading to two waves of interspecies transmission between humans and civets (Fig. 5). 
Currently, the weakly virulent huSARS-CoVs may still exist among humans. Of concern is the possibility 
that they could evolve into highly virulent strains when favorable climate conditions occur, highlighting a 
potential risk of the reemergence of SARS [45]. Therefore, routine surveillance for the detection of 
huSARS-CoVs together with increased attention to climate changes are strongly urged to prevent the 
reemergence of SARS. 
Materials and Methods 
Ethics Statement
This study was done according to the Helsinki II Declaration and was approved by the medical ethics 
committee of the Second Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University. To investigate the 
seroprevalence of SARS-CoV, we collected sera or plasma from 274 adults and 474 children during 
2009-2011 and stored them at -80°C in Guangzhou Municipal Key Laboratory of Allergy & Clinical 
Immunology, the Second Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University, until analysis. Verbal 
informed consents from the adult participants and the parents of the child participants for allergen 
diagnosis and other serological tests were obtained. Because this study was not involved in any individual 
privacy, the institutional review board waived the need for written informed consent from the participants. 
In addition, we also collected plasma samples from 19 previous SARS patients with written informed
consents in December 2011.
Sequence data collection
A total of 139 Spike (S) gene sequences of SARS-CoVs were retrieved from the GenBank according to 
three previous studies [3,5,7,35]. Among them, 59 S gene sequences have known times of sample 
collection, including 19 from bats, 18 from palm civets and 22 from humans, and were used to construct a 
time-scaled maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree for inferring the ancestral host sources of SARS-CoV 
[25,46]. The MCC tree shows a topology consistent with a previous study [28]. In addition, 102 S gene 
sequences from humans were used to infer the geographic origin of SARS-CoV. 
Reconstruction of time scale and ancestral host sources of SARS-CoVs
The codon alignment of all sequences was performed using the CLUSTAL W program implemented in 
MEGA 5.05 [47]. The MCC trees were constructed with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method 
implemented in the BEAST v1.6.2 package, which combines time-of-sampling information and generates 
rooted trees [24]. The initial 25% of the trees were discarded as burn-in when we summarized the trees 
using TreeAnnotator v1.6.2. All of these trees were edited and viewed with FigTree v1.3.1. The 
evolutionary rates and the times to the most recent common ancestors (tMRCA) of various nodes in the 
MCC tree were estimated by BEAST. A relaxed molecular clock with an uncorrelated log-normal 
distribution and a constant population size model were used in the MCMC analyses. The codon-based 
substitution model (SRD06) was chosen as the nucleotide substitution model. The 95% highest probability 
density (HPD) was used to reflect the statistical uncertainty in parameter estimates. MCMC analysis was 
run for at least 1000 million generations, with sampling every 10,000 generations. The program Tracer 
v1.5 (tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer/) was used to check for the convergence and to determine whether 
effective sample size (ESS)>200. 
Each sequence was assigned a character state reflecting its host source or sampling location. Ancestral 
host source or location state was inferred using a geographically explicit Bayesian MCMC method under 
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the asymmetric CTMC model for discrete state reconstructions implemented in the BEAST v1.6.2 
package [25,46]. The ancestral host source and geographic origin were accessed by posterior probability 
that is calculated based on the posterior density of trees. 
Ancestral sequence reconstruction
To investigate the adaptive changes in the S gene during SARS-CoV cross-species transmission, the 
ancestral S protein sequences at several crucial nodes were reconstructed using MEGA 5.05 package with 
maximum-likelihood (ML) method based on the topology of MCC tree [47]. The best-fitting nucleotide 
substitution model of TN (Tamura-Nei) 93 was selected. 
Seroprevalence of SARS-CoVs among children in Guangdong
To determine whether SARS-CoVs are still circulating among humans, we investigated the current 
seroprevalence of SARS-CoV in children in Guangdong, China. Stored sera from 474 children were 
obtained from the Second Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University. The samples were 
collected during 2009-2011 when these children had acute tracheobronchitis, and included 157 samples 
from 2009, 160 samples from 2010 and 157 samples from 2011. All children were born after 2005 with 
average age of 2.5 years old at the time of sample collection (Table 2). In addition, 274 stored adult sera 
were also obtained from the First and Second Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University. To 
determine whether SARS-CoVs were circulating among the population in Guangdong before the 
2003-2004 SARS outbreak, stored sera from 42 individuals who received bone marrow transplantation 
between 2000 and 2002 were obtained from the Guangzhou Blood Center. These sera were collected 
before the SARS outbreak.  
Because the IgG antibody against SARS-CoV has a longer half-life in serum than the IgM antibody 
[48], the SARS-CoV lysate ELISA IgG Kit (Beijing BGI-GBI Biotech Co., Ltd., Beijing, China) was 
selected to specifically detect IgG antibody against SARS-CoV. This kit has high sensitivity and 
specificity for SARS-CoV (Ref) and was approved by the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) 
for the detection of anti-SARS-CoV immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibody from human serum or plasma 
specimens. To reduce and/or exclude the possibility of cross reactivity with other huCoVs, tests for other 
huCoV infections were also performed using a huCoV ELISA IgG Kit (Shanghai Lianshuo Bio-Tech Co., 
Ltd, Shanghai, China. The reagents (including antigens and antibodies) used in this kit were imported 
from Rapidbio, an US reagent company. All assays were performed according to the manufacturer’s 
instructions. 
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Supporting Information
Table S1. Detection of SARS-CoV- and huCoV-specific antibodies. 
Detection of SARS-CoV-specific 
antibodies
Positive Negative Total Percentage (%)
Detection 
of huCoV-
specific
antibodies
Child 
samples
Positive 39 100 139 51.3
Negative 26 106 132 48.7
Total 65 206 271
Percentage (%) 24.0 76.0
Adult 
samples
Positive 0 36 36 40.0
Negative 0 54 54 60.0
Total 0 90 90
Percentage (%) 0.0 100.0
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Figure S1. Detection of recombination in the origin of human SARS-CoV. A, the phylogeny 
of huSARS-CoVs, pcSARS-CoVs and batSARS-CoVs. B, a similarity plot analysis detected a 
recombination occurring in a region including the 29-nt sequence. C, sequence comparison of the 
29-nt region between huSARS-CoV, pcSARS-CoV and batSARS-CoV. The tree of SARS-CoVs 
is obtained from Figure 1. The similarity plot analysis was performed using SimPlot version 3.5.
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Figure S2. MCC tree of S gene sequences from huSARS-CoV. Ancestral geographic states 
were reconstructed using Bayesian phylogeographic inference framework implemented in the 
BEAST v1.6.2 package. The tree branches are colored according to their respective geographical 
locations. From the tree, we found that huSARS-CoV originated in Guangdong, and from 
Guangdong, SARS-CoV strains was transmitted to other provinces of China and other 
countries/regions. This result is consistent with the epidemiological pattern of SARS-CoV.
